Suchergebnisse

This paper focuses on powerful third parties whose interests in a conflict are closely aligned with a single disputant's interests. I show that such third-party bias reveals private information about an intervener's willingness to secure an agreement using force. When a highly biased power intervenes in a crisis, a peaceful settlement is likely because warring parties are certain the third party will enforce an agreement by military means. When an intervener shows less favoritism, negotiations tend to fail because the disputants doubt that it is committed to use force. Peace is again more likely when the third party is unbiased because such a party behaves as a mediator, seeking agreements both adversaries find acceptable. These findings, coupled with evidence from U.S. and British interventions in the Balkans, suggest a possible explanation for why major power intervention can bring about drastically different outcomes.

We investigate the effect of ethnic pluralism on mediation in interstate and internationalized civil crises from 1945 to 2010. We find that mediation succeeds when two conditions are met. First, success is more likely when there are fewer disenfranchised ethnic groups in the disputant population, because these groups are usually excluded from peace talks and often use violence to challenge peace. Second, mediators are more likely to succeed when politically included disputants, usually present at peace talks, comprise various different ethnic groups. Because such groups, numerous as they are, pull and tug for dominance at peace negotiations, they are unable to form decisive coalitions. As a result, third parties have a chance to serve in a more authoritative role and influence a settlement.

We investigate the effect of ethnic pluralism on mediation in interstate and internationalized civil crises from 1945 to 2010. We find that mediation succeeds when two conditions are met. First, success is more likely when there are fewer disenfranchised ethnic groups in the disputant population, because these groups are usually excluded from peace talks and often use violence to challenge peace. Second, mediators are more likely to succeed when politically included disputants, usually present at peace talks, comprise various different ethnic groups. Because such groups, numerous as they are, pull and tug for dominance at peace negotiations, they are unable to form decisive coalitions. As a result, third parties have a chance to serve in a more authoritative role and influence a settlement.